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PROSPECTUS LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO DISCLOSE
POST-EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS: A NEW DUTY AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS
The prospectus has always been a significant instrument in the secur-
ities field. Its use furthers the basic purpose of the Securities Act of
19331 to secure "full disclosure of every essentially important element
attending the issue of a newsecurity. . . ." and to impose "high stand-
ards of trusteeship" upon all persons "who sponsor the investment of
other peoples' money."2 In pursuit of this purpose the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) has continuously reviewed and revised
prospectus requirements.' Through this process and through court deci-
sions,' liability for breach of the duty of disclosure has been continuously
expanded.
The recent case of SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.5 exempli-
fies this trend. In Manor, an issuer initiated an effort to sell 450,000
shares of stock.' In the prospectus the issuer said that the offering would
be on an "all or nothing basis," 7 that the proceeds would be placed in an
escrow account "unavailable for other uses,"8 and that the shares would
be sold for cash only.' The prospectus did not provide for any special
types of compensation to be given to certain purchasers or brokerage
firms. From the beginning the underwriter experienced difficulty selling
the stock. To assist in developing sales, an extensive solicitation of broker-
age firms, corporations, and individuals was made. During this solicita-
tion, several parties were able to secure favors and special compensation
from the issuer for their participation in the offering. Also, when it ap-
1. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the 1933 Act].
2. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1933).
3. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.425 (1970) (redefining printed type size require-
ments) ; 17 C.F.R. § 230.426 (1970) (redefining disclosure requirements for over-allot-
ment sales designed to stabilize the market price of stock) ; 17 C.F.R. § 230.433 (1970)
(establishing requirements applicable to pre-effective date prospectuses); 17 C.F.R. §
230A34a (1970) (establishing requirements for summary prospectuses).
4. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc) cert. denied 394 U.S. 976 (1969) ; Kohler v. Kohler Co., 318 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.
1963); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). See generally, Ruder, Pitfalls it
the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implication Through Rule rob-5,
59 Nw. U.L. REv. 185, 186 (1964).
5. 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
6. Id. at 1090.
7. Id. at 1089-90. All shares offered on an "all or nothing" basis must be sold
within a specified period. Otherwise the offering terminates and all funds are returned
to the subscribers. Id. at 1089-90.
8. 458 F.2d at 1090.
9. Id.
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peared that all of the shares would not be sold by the closing date speci-
fied on the prospectus, a number of "bootstrapping" sales ' were made
which required drawing checks on sales proceeds which had never been
placed in the escrow account. As a result, many of the terms of the pros-
pectus and those of a subsequent amendment were violated. In an action
brought by the SEC, the district court found that the stock issue violated
the anti-fraud and prospectus delivery requirements of the securities acts
and issued an order for injunctive relief." On appeal, the Second Circuit
affirmed on both counts. Not surprisingly, as to the first charge, the
appellate court held that
the effect of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act (§
17(a)) and of the Exchange Act (§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5)
is to require the prospectus to reflect any post-effective changes
necessary to keep the prospectus from being misleading in any
material respect. 2
However, the court went further and held that, pursuant to the pros-
pectus delivery requirements of the 1933 Act,
10. Id. at 1091. Checks were drawn on sales proceeds which had never been placed
in the escrow account and were made payable to a corporation which was controlled by
a member of the Manor selling group. These funds were used to purchase additional
Manor shares. Id.
11. SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
12. 458 F.2d at 1096.
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act provides that
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities . . .
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that
It shall be unlawful for any person, . . [to] use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
[SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the 1934 Act].
Rule lob-5 provides that
It shall be unlawful for any person . . .
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970).
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the appellants were under a duty to amend or supplement the
Manor prospectus to reflect post-effective developments; that
their failure to do so stripped the Manor prospectus of compli-
ance with § 10(a); and that appellants therefore violated §
5 (b) (2).y5
This note explores the duty to reflect post-effective developments
in the prospectus under both approaches and also discusses a new SEC
stop order policy which may lie behind the decision in Manor.
DUTY UNDER ANTI-FRAUD RULES
The SEC, commentators, and courts have recognized that the anti-
fraud provisions of the securities acts require that post-effective develop-
ments which materially alter the picture expressed in the registration
statement must be communicated to the offerees."4 Authorities also recog-
nize the prospectus as a vehicle for satisfying this duty. 5 Consistent
with this background, the Manor court used the anti-fraud provisions
of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and rule 10b-5
to support its first theory of liability. Quoting from SEC v. Bangor
Punta Corp.," the Manor court said:
"[t]he effect of the anti-fraud provisions . . . is to require
the prospectus to reflect any post-effectve changes necessary
to keep the prospectus from being misleading in any material
respect . .
13. 458 F.2d at 1100. Section 10(a) (1) of the 1933 Act provides in part that "a
prospectus . . . shall contain the information contained in the registration state-
ment. . . ." 15 U.S.C. 77j(a) (1) (1970).
Section 5(b) (2) of the 1933 Act provides that
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to carry . . . in interstate commerce
any . . . security for the purpose of sale or delivery after sale, unless accom-
panied or preceded by a prospectus that meets the requirements of [Section
10(a)].
15 U.S.C. 77e(b)(2) (1970).
14. In one of its earliest decisions the SEC announced that any purchaser who fails
to make such disclosures is liable for recision under § 12 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
771 (1970), and subject to injunction under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)
(1970). Charles A. Howard, 1 S.E.C. 6, 10 (1933), accord, SEC v. Bangor Punta
Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); 1 L. Loss, SEcURITIEs REGULATiON 293 (2d
ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]; H. SowADs, FEDERAL SECumiTiEs ACT § 7.06[2]
(1965) [hereinafter cited as SowARus].
15. See, e.g., SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Loss, sipra note 14; SowARns, supra note 14.
16. 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (defendant required to offer recision to
its shareholders because of its failure to accurately disclose the value of one of its
major assets).
17. 458 F.2d at 1096. The court also relied on Danser v. United States, 281 F.2d
492 (1st Cir. 1960). 458 F.2d at 1096. In Danser the First Circuit concluded that a
failure to disclose post-effective developments would result in § 17(a) liability. Danser
v. United States, supra at 496-97.
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There are two ways in which information reflecting post-effective
changes can be communicated to purchasers. First, the prospectus (and
registration statement) can be amended; this requires review and de-
claration of effectiveness by the SEC." Second, the prospectus can be
supplemented by means of a sticker or similar attachment. 9 A supple-
mented prospectus is not processed as such by the SEC. The rules only
require that 25 copies be filed with the Commission before it is used."
An accepted rule of thumb for determining which of the two methods
to use is that addition of information indicates supplementing, while
substitution of information suggests amending.2'
In most cases, which involve failure to disclose post-effective changes,
the issuer has made no attempt whatsoever to communicate the informa-
tion. Thus the courts have not been forced to decide when amendment
rather than mere supplementation is necessary to avoid liability. Manor
typifies such cases by its simple conclusion that disclosure must be made,
without indicating what form that disclosure must take.2
DuTY UNDER §§ 10(A) AND 5(B) (2) OF THE 1933 ACT
In addition to finding that the issuer in Manor violated the anti-
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(c) (1970); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.470-230.478 (1970). Amend-
ments filed after the effective date of the registration statement become effective when
the Commission so orders. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(c) (1970). However, amendments filed prior
to the effective date become effective automatically in 20 days. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a)
(1970). When the amendment is declared effective it becomes a part of the registration
statement. Thus, the amendment would also be subject to stop order from § 8(d) and
would also create potential § 11 liability. 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (1970).
19. The way the new facts . . . are brought to the attention of offerees as a
matter of mechanics is by putting a sticker on the prospectus or supplementing
it otherwise, not by amending the registration statement.
SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1095 (2d Cir. 1972) (quoting Loss,
supra note 14).
As a practical matter such a method has two advantages. First, it assures that the
information will arrive and, second, it assures that the information will not precede the
statutory prospectus and thus violate § 5(b) (2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970),
relating to the sale of securities without a prospectus. For the text of § 5(b) (2), see
note 12 supra.
20. 17 C.F.R. § 230.424 (1970).
21. SEC Securities Act Release No. 97n (Dec. 28, 1933). See SowAms, supra
note 14, at §§ 7.05[3], 7.06[2] [a]. Even this rule of thumb is not without exception
where the additions represent "numerous and significant changes in the issuers affairs."
Franchard Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4710 (July 31, 1964). Accord, Kin-
ner Airplane & Motor Corp., 2 S.E.C. 943, 951 (1937).
Whether information is added information or substituted information may in some
situations be difficult enough to determine. But the "numerous and significant" excep-
tion adds an additional burden of recognizing the point at which post-effective develop-
ments are of such a quantity or of such importance that amendment is necessary.
22. See, e.g., Danser v. United States, 281 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1960) ; SEC v. Ban-
gor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
23. 458 F.2d at 1095.
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fraud rules, the court held that
* appellants were under a duty to amend or supplement the Manor
prospectus to reflect post-effective developments; that their
failure to do so stripped the Manor prospectus of compliance
with § l0(a); and that appellants therefore violated §
5(b) (2).24
The language of § 10(a) does not include a general duty to update
prospectuses. Section 10(a) (3) requires supplementation when the
prospectus is used nine months after the effective date and the informa-
tion contained in it is 16 months old.2" Other than this provision, the
only substantive requirement on prospectus content is § 10(a) (1),
which states that the prospectus "shall contain the information contained
in the registration statement." 2'
As the Manor court recognized, a line of authority holds that there
is no duty to update the registration statement to reflect post-effective
developments." In Charles A. Howard,8 the leading authority for this
position, the SEC said that the truth of the information in the registra-
tion statement is only tested as of the time it becomes effective. If the
registration statement is true at the effective date, there is no duty to up-
date it even though it subsequently becomes false and misleading. 8 The
SEC has adopted this position because of its interpretation of § 8(d)
of the 1933 Act which provides that a stop order may be issued
if it appears to the Commission at any time that the registration
statement includes any untrue statement of a material fact or
omits to state any material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading...
In Howard, the SEC said that
[Section 8(d)] does not . . . permit the Commission to issue
24. Id. at 1100.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 77j (a) (3) (1970).
26. Id. § 77i (a) (1).
27. Funeral Directors Mfg. & Supply Co., 39 S.E.C. 33, 34 (1959) ; United States
Molybdenum Corp., 10 S.E.C. 796, 805 (1941); Oklahoma-Texas Trust, 2 S.E.C. 764,
782-83 (1937), aff'd, 100 F.2d 888 (C.A. 10, 1939), Kinner Airplane & Motor Corp., 2
S.E.C. 943, 951 (1937) ; National Invested Say. Corp., 2 S.E.C. 113, 117 (1937) ; Charles
A. Howard, 1 S.E.C. 6, 10 (1934). See SoWArDs, supra note 14.
28. 1 S.E.C. 6 (1934).
29. Id. at 10. See Sow-ms, supra note 14. It is interesting to note that one of the
cases cited by the Manor court as supporting the duty to reflect post-effective develop-
ments under the fraud theory also clearly recognizes that the registration statement
speaks as of the effective date. SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154, 1160
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1970) (emphasis added).
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a stop order if it finds that a statement which reflected the truth
as of the time the registration statement became effective no
longer reflects the truth.31
The SEC thus interpreted "at any time" to mean that it may issue a stop
order at any time it discovers that a statement did "not reflect the truth
as of the time that the registration statement became effective. . . .;" but
the SEC may not issue a stop order for a statement true at the effec-
tive date which becomes untrue at any time after the effective date.82
This interpretation has found some support in the case law.3" It
would seem, therefore, that a prospectus required only to "contain the
information contained in the registration statement," would need no up-
dating to satisfy the statute.
Manor found this line of argument unpersuasive." The court held
that implicit in § 10(a) (1)'s requirement that the prospectus contain
certain information, was the additional requirement that such informa-
tion be true and correct."3 Reasoning from this holding, the court further
held that since the information supplied in the prospectus was not "true
and correct" at the delivery date, the prospectus did not comply with §
10(a), and therefore violated § 5(b)(2). Neither the exact source
of the implication underlying the court's first holding nor the reasoning
involved in drawing such an implication were explained by the court or
supported by the authority cited." Moreover, the court gave no authority
31. 1 S.E.C. at 10.
32. Id. Although some commentators have disagreed with the SEC's interpreta-
tion of § 8(d), they have generally concluded that a registration statement need
not be amenaed after its effective date to reflect post-effective developments. Loss,
supra note 14, at 290; Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227,
243 (1933).
Section 11 also supports the proposition that there is no duty to update the registra-
tion statement. Liability under § 11 does not attach if the inaccuracy of the registration
statement is the result of post-effective date changes. 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (1970).
33. SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
34. Although conceding that Howard found no duty to update the registration
statement, the Manor court cited Howard as recognizing a duty to update the prospectus.
458 F.2d at 1099. Manor thus implied that §§ 5(b) or 10(a) created the duty. While
Howard does recognize a duty to reflect post-effective developments in the prospectus
it did not base its conclusion on §§ 5(b) and 10(a). Rather, its conclusion was based
on an interpretation of the anti-fraud provisions of §§ 12 and 17(a).
35. 458 F.2d at 1098.
36. To support its holding that information required by § 10(a) (1) must be true
and correct, Manor cited SEC v. North American Fin., Co., 214 F. Supp. 197 (D. Ariz.
1959), and Eugene M. Rosenson, 40 S.E.C. 948 (1961). These two cases arose out of
the same factual occurrence. In Rosenson the information in the prospectus and regis-
tration statement as well as subsequent amendments was found to be false concerning
the "independent" certification of financial statements by the accountant and it was
further found that this information was untrue and misleading when filed. Eugene M.
Rosenson, supra at 952. The Commission also found that these false statements were
willfully made. Id. at 951. The SEC held that it was "implicit from . .. Sections 7
469
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or rationale for its additional assertion that the prospectus must change
to reflect developments occurring after the effective date.
Addressing the long assumed absence of a duty to update the regis-
tration statement, the Manor court considered the existence of this duty
an open question, but found resolution unnecessary for decision of the
case. 7 Therefore, whether or not the registration statement has to be
amended, the prospectus must be changed to reflect post-effective develop-
ments. As mentioned above, Manor also left open the question whether
amendment or mere supplementation of the prospectus is required to
satisfy the § 10(a) duty.8 If supplementation is acceptable, then it may
indeed be possible for the new prospectus duty to coexist with the absence
of a corresponding duty to update the registration statement.
SIGNIFICANCE OF MANOR
Liability under § 5(b) for failure to update prospectuses is clearly
a novel creation in Manor. Its creation was apparently also unnecessary
because the defendant had already been found in violation of the anti-
fraud rules. Yet both the SEC in its brief 9 and the court in its decision
went to great lengths to establish this new principle. Since the reason for
this effort is not clear from the Manor opinion and facts, some specula-
tion is required to determine the significance of the decision. Manor's
impact can best be judged by examining its effect on the three major
means of enforcing securities laws: injunctions by the SEC, private
actions by investors, and stop orders.
Iniunctions
Section 20(b) of the 1933 Act grants the SEC authority to sue in
federal courts for injunctions whenever it appears that
any person is engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices
which constitute or will constitute a violation of the provisions
and 10 that a registration statement and prospectus contain certain information, and that
certain information be true and correct." Id. at 952. The Commission said that its con-
clusion was "confirmed by Section 24 of the Securities Act, which provides criminal
penalties for any untrue or misleading statement of a material fact in any registration
statement filed under that Act." Id. (emphasis added). Since the statements were un-
true when made, a stop order would have been available as well as prosecution under the
fraud provisions. Therefore, these cases do nothing to support the position of the
Manor court as to creation of a duty under §§ 5(b) and 10(a) to update the prospectus
for developments which occur after the effective date of the registration statement. The
only clear meaning of Rosenson and North American is that the prospectus and regis-
tration statement must be true and correct when filed.
37. 458 F.2d at 1099 n24.
38. Id. at 1099 n.23.
39. Brief for Appellee, SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d
Cir. 1972) [hereinafter cited as SEC Brief].
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of the title, or of any rule or regulation prescribed under author-
ity thereof.
Thus the authority of the SEC to seek an injunction extends to violations
of both § § 5 and 17, and the authority has been used to enjoin violations
of both sections in the past."-
The impact of the new § 5 liability on § 20 (b) injunctions can best
be measured by determining whether such liability will be more expansive
than that now imposed by the anti-fraud provisions of § 17. Section 5
on its face requires no element of scienter.42 The Manor court under-
took an examination of the good faith of the defendants in connection
with the anti-fraud rules and found it lacking.4" However, no separate
examination or mention of the element was made in the portion of the
opinion dealing with §§ 10(a) and 5(b). Thus, strict liability for mis-
statements remains a possibility under § 5(b)." This result contrasts
with the current case law on § 17 injunctions which at least requires
proof of negligence." No cases have granted § 17 injunctions under a
strict liability standard, and defendants have been allowed to defeat such
injunctions by showing due diligence." Section 17(a) (2) also requires
proof of misstatements of material facts.4 A large body of case law has
developed defining "materiality" as it relates to the various anti-fraud
rules.4s The Manor court repeatedly used the term "material" to describe
40. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970).
41. E.g., SEC v. Globus Int'l, Ltd., 320 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
42. Section 5 merely speaks of sales activities without a registration statement,
without a prospectus satisfying § 10, or while a § 8 stop order is in effect. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77e (1970). Nothing in § 5 conditions liability on the existence of any particular state
of mind.
43. 458 F.2d at 1096-97.
44. See United States v. Sussman, 37 F. Supp. 294, 296 (E.D. Pa. 1941) (criminal
case holding that defendant's knowledge of the security's sale in violation of the law
was not an element of § 5(a) violation).
45. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969) ; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) cert. denied 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
46. SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Walker v. SEC, 383 F.2d
344, 345 (2d Cir. 1967).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2) (1970).
48. In an action by the SEC for injunctive relief, a material fact is considered
that which would cause a reasonable investor to rely thereon and in reliance cause him
to buy or sell a corporation's securities. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
849 (2d Cir. 1968) cert. denied 394 U.S. 976 (1969) ; SEC v. R. A. Holman & Co., 366
F.2d 456, 459 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 915 (1961). At one
time it was thought that only facts involved in "extraordinary" situations which would
substantially affect the market price were material facts. Fleischer, Securities Trading
and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Pro-
ceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1289 (1965). Later decisions have not required "extra-
ordinary" facts such as information related to dividend distributions or earnings. "Ma-
terial facts" now extends to those facts which would affect the "desire of the investor
to buy, sell, or hold." Bromberg, Corporate Information: Texas Gulf Sulphur and Its
Implications, 22 Sw. L.J. 731, 741 (1968).
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the types of changes which § 10(a) requires to be communicated."9 It
is possible, therefore, that the familiar tests developed in the context of
the anti-fraud rules will be carried over to § 5(b) prospectus liabilities,
and materiality will need to be proved under both theories to secure an
injunction.
Purchasers Actions
Section 12(1) of the 1933 Act gives the purchaser a cause of action
for damages against "any person who offers or sells a security in viola-
tion of section 5 .... ."0 Thus, violations of §§ 5(b) and 10(a) as
found in Manor give purchasers the right, under § 12, "to recover the
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, [less income
received], . . . or for damages if he no longer owns the security."51
The relative importance of Manor to purchasers' remedies is de-
pendent upon whether § 12 (1) liability will now be more expansive than
that already imposed by the anti-fraud provisions. Prior cases under §
12(1) have dealt almost exclusively with sale of securities without regis-
tration.52 Since the existence of the registration statement was the pri-
mary issue in these cases, a finding against the seller on this point was
virtually determinative of liability.5" Because of these early cases, and
the wording of the statutes, the issues of reliance, scienter, good faith,
49. 458 F.2d at 1098-99.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
51. Id.
52 Moses v. Michael, 292 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1961). Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234
F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Repass v. Rees, 174 F. Supp. 898 (D.C. Colo. 1959);
Dupler v. Simmons, 163 F. Supp. 535 (D.C. Colo. 1958).
53. Lynn v. Caraway, 252 F. Supp. 858, 863 (note 6) (W.D. La. 1966), affd 379
F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 951 (dictum); Loss, supra note 14, at
1693. To establish a prima facie case for unregistered sale under § 12(1), the plain-
tiff need only prove five elements. First, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant
was an offeror or seller or a person in control of an offeror or seller. Securities Act of
1933, § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1970); id. § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970). Accord,
Loss, supra note 14, at 1719; SowARDs, supra note 14, at § 9.03[1]. Second, he must
prove that the mails or an instrumentality of interstate commerce was used in the offer
or sale. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970); Loss, supra note 14, at
1693. Third, he must show that the transmittal of a prospectus has taken place.
SowARDS, supra note 14, at § 9.03. Fourth, he must show that the defendant failed to
comply with the prospectus requirements of § 10. Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15
U.S.C. § 77e (1970) ; id. § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1970). Accord, Loss, supra note 14, at
1693; SOWARDS, supra note 14, at § 9.03. Finally, the plaintiff must prove that a regis-
tration statement has not been filed. Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970) ;
SOWARDS, supra note 14, at § 9.03. Once a prima facie case has been established, the
only meaningful defense is that of exemption under §§ 3 or 4. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1970)
(exempted securities); id. § 77d (exempted transactions). See Winter v. D. J. & M.
Inv. & Constr. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 943, 946 (S.D. Cal. 1960) ; SOWARDS, supra note 14,
at § 9.03. Under certain circumstances the defendant may also assert waiver or estoppel
defenses to § 12 liability. Straley v. Universal Uranium & Milling Corp., 289 F.2d 370,
373-74 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Dale v. Rosenfeld, 229 F.2d 855, 859 (2d Cir. 1956).
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knowledge of the alleged violation, and causation have been completely
irrelevant in § 12(1) cases prior to Manor.
Not so for liability under the anti-fraud provisions. There, the
purchaser"4 must show a connection between his detriment and the seller's
misstatements or omissions of "material facts."" To determine whether
the particular plaintiff was so influenced, courts must consider the related
issues of material fact, reliance, and causation." At common law the
plaintiff had to prove reliance and a causal connection between defendant's
conduct and his own."' Congress, through enactment of the securities
law, has lifted the burden of proving "active" reliance as a condition of
recovery." The test of reliance for cases of material omissions has been
held to be "whether the plaintiff would have been influenced to act dif-
ferently. . . if the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact. 59
However, a recent decision has apparently returned to a more active
standard by holding that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's
misstatements or omissions played a substantial part in bringing about
the plaintiff's injury and, further, that the injury was a direct result of
the defendant's action."0 In any event, the requirements of causation,
reliance, and material fact are probably necessary to put some limit on
liability,0" and to that extent are generally desirable.
54. While an action under §§ 12(1), 12(2), 11, and 17(a) of the 1933 Act can
only be brought by purchasers, an action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5
may be brought by sellers as well as purchasers. Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455, 456
(6th Cir. 1970) ; Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956.
55. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965).
56. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965). While courts use a reasonable investor standard to decide what are "ma-
terial facts" in injunctive proceedings brought by the SEC, in private actions for dam-
ages, the question is whether the particular plaintiff would be influenced. Id.
57. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 105, at 686 (4th ed. 1971); SOWARDS, supra note 14, at
§ 10.01[2]; 50 MNN. L. REv. 759, 763-64 (1966).
58. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965); SOwARDS, supra note 14, at § 10.01[2]. Further, liability under § 12(2)
requires no reliance at all. Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 356 (10th Cir. 1970); Wood-
ward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 116 (10th Cir. 1959) ; Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836,
841 (2d Cir. 1968).
59. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965) ; Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
60. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1291 (2d Cir. 1969)
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
61. Id.; Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., Inc., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir.) cert. de-
ntied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) ; Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 544 (2d
Cir. 1967); Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See
Painter, Insider Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal Corpora-
tion Law Under Rule iob-5, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 1361, 1366-72 (1965); Note, Civil Li-
ability Under Section rob and Rule iob-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of
Privilty, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 667-74 (1965).
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Also, in contrast to the early § 12(1) cases the anti-fraud provi-
sions, such as § 12(2), require a showing of negligence.2 Accordingly,
§ 12(2) provides a due dilligence defense. Thus a defendant is not
liable if he
sustain[s] the burden of proof that he did not know, and in
the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such
untruth or omission. .... 63
In sum, it seems unlikely that the courts, with their general dis-
favor of strict liability, will consider § 12(1) precedent persuasive in
personal damage actions based on §§ 5(b) and 10(a) as expanded in
Manor. As indicated above, the courts have tried in some instances to
put limits on the liability created by the anti-fraud rules by using such
doctrines as reliance and due diligence. Furthermore, the Manor court
included "materiality" as a prerequisite to its expanded § 5 liability."
Assuming that materiality will remain a requirement for § 5(b) and §
10(a) liability, many of the other elements required for liability under
the anti-fraud provisions will likely follow."
Stop Orders
The Manor decision does not overturn the longstanding SEC rule
that § 8(d) stop orders cannot be issued against a registered offering
for failure to reflect post-effective developments." The court assumes
this rule's validity before proceeding to explain the § 10(a) duty to
update prospectuses.67 However, the case is significant to stop orders
in two ways. First, the court indicated that the issue of whether or not a
registration statement speaks only as of its effective date is an open ques-
62. Some cases have held that mere negligence was sufficient in private actions for
damages. Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965); Ellis v. Carter, 291
F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212
(9th Cir. 1962). Though the mere negligence standard is still the subject of much de-
bate, see Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1290-91 (2d Cir. 1969)
and Ellis v. Carter, supra at 272-74, recent decisions indicate that mere negligence is
not enough to support an action for damages under § 17(a) or Rule 10b-5. Shemtob v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971); Globus v. Law Research
Service, Inc., supra at 1290-91.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2). See Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 357 (10th Cir. 1970);
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
64. 458 F.2d at 1098.
65. For example, the material fact standard requires a misstatement or omission
of information that a reasonable investor would rely on to make an investment decision.
An issuer, at least, would be considered negligent, since through due diligence he should
be able to discover any change in a truly material fact. If the material fact standard is
carried over to § 5 violations, then the elements of reliance, negligence and due dili-
gence will also likely be required for liability.
66. See text accompanying notes 27-32 supra.
67. 458 F.2d at 1099.
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tion.8 This posture gives room for examination and change by other
courts. Second, and more importantly, the SEC itself requested the court
to characterize the rule in a way which would remove statutory barriers
to the rule's modification."' The fact that this characterization is sup-
ported by the SEC makes change likely as well as possible.
As mentioned above, the SEC previously felt that it was without
power to stop order a registration statement if post-effective developments
made the statement untrue."' The SEC's brief in Manor reveals that it
has changed this position. The brief characterizes the Charles A.
Howard" line of cases as not based on statutory interpretation of §
8(d), as was stated in the Howard case, but rather as based on a series
of discretionary refusals ta exert statutory power for reasons of policy
and convenience." In support of its newly claimed authority, the SEC
quotes the House Report of the 1933 Act as indicating that Congress
intended the Commission to have and use stop order power when a regis-
tration statement became misleading." The same House Report had
been put forth by commentators as inconsistent with the Howard rule, "
and it does indeed support the new interpretation.75
The SEC's brief indicates that the factors which determine when §
5(b) has been violated by delivery of an out-of-date prospectus are the
same factors which go into the stop order decision."' The SEC's argu-
68. Id. at 1099 n.24.
69. SEC Brief, supra note 39, at 44-49.
70. See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra.
71. 1 S.E.C. 6 (1933). See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra.
72. The basis for the adoption of this position in those cases was the Commis-
sion's belief that, if the truth or falsity of a registration statement were to be
determined after its effective date, an issuer, in order to avoid the risk of a
stop order, would have to halt its offering repeatedly each time a material
post-effective event occurred until an amendment to the registration statement
should be filed and declared effective. Such a result, of course, would impose
an unnecessary burden upon honest issuers involved in legitimate public offer-
ings, since compliance by the issuer with other provisions of the statute nor-
mally would assure full disclosure to investors of developments occurring dur-
ing the selling period.
SEC Brief, supra note 39, at 47-48.
73. In determining whether a stop order should issue, the Commission will
naturally have regard to the facts as they then exist and will stop order the
further sale of securities even thotgh the registration statement was true when
made, [and] it has become untrue or misleading by reason of subsequent de-
velopnents.
H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1933) (emphasis added). SEC Brief,
supra note 39, at 46.
74. See, e.g., Loss, supra note 14, at 290.
75. Language in the House Report clearly flies in the face of the Howard rule.
For the specific language, see notes 73 supra & 76 infra.
76. After [the registration statement becomes effective] . . . securities may
be sold . . . only if the buyer is given a substantial replica of the information
included in the "registration statement"; and if sales are made without giving
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mert in Manor may well indicate the criteria which it will use when and
if it exerts its stop order authority. An excerpt from the brief demon-
strates the Commission's perspective on post-effective developments.
After noting policy considerations applied in the Howard line of cases,"
the brief continues:
But the Commission has never applied this policy where, as here,
the post-effective deveopments involved a major and substantial
change in the basic nature and terms of the public offering which
was deliberately, willfully and voluntarily effected by the issuer
and selling shareholders. Under such circumstances it is clear
that no unnecessary burden is imposed in requiring an amend-
ment of the registration statement and prospectus since those
kinds of changes are of such magnitude and purport that the
misleading impression conveyed to investors in the prospectus
could not be cured simply by stickering or otherwise supplement-
ing the prospectus."
The test suggested above will probably not remain in such a restricted
form. The context of an appellate brief and the need to distinguish the
Howard line of cases exerted pressure on the Commission to state the
narrowest and most persuasively clear basis for SEC action. In practice,
such restraints would not be present, and the real policies underlying
regulation of distributions would lead to development of new criteria.
The factor of deliberateness is not relevant in any stop order proceeding 9
and almost certainly will be dropped. The other criterion, that the
change involve the nature and terms of the offering, is substantive and
may, with more definition and explanation, prove to be a meaningful
distinction.
Where the condition of the issuer or his assets substantially change,
and therefore the original prospectus would mislead a reasonable investor,
such changes should be disclosed. Supplementation of the prospectus
should satisfy this duty. But where there is a "major and substantial"
change in the "nature and terms" of the offer itself, the registration state-
ment no longer fully covers the actual distribution. Thus, amendment
of the registration and prespectus should be required. Should the issuer
the buyer such information, or if even after [the effective date] the Commission
discovers that the "registration statement" is or has become false, inadequate
or misleading, . . . the Commission may . . . stop order . . . the further
sale of such securities.
H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1933) (emphasis added). SEC Brief,
supra note 39, at 46.
77. See note 72 supra & text accompanying.
78. SEC Brief, supra note 39, at 48.
79. Loss, supra note 14, at 304.
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not file an amendment, the SEC should have the right to stop order the
registration.
CONCLUSION
Manor clearly holds that there is a duty to update the prospectus
under both the anti-fraud rules and the prospectus delivery requirements
of §§ 5(b) (2) and 10(a). This latter liability is a novel creation and
has implications on three major methods of enforcing the 1933 Act-
injunctions, purchasers' actions, and stop orders. With regard to. this last
method, the new stop order policy suggested by the SEC in its brief may
ultimately give Manor its greatest significance.
JON S. READNOUR
